


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Agency-Level Planning in CIA

1964 to 1971




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Agency-Level Planning in CIA

The purpose of this paper is to present a brief, historical sketch of CIA's progress in planning at the agency level. The phrase "Agency Level" was selected after careful thought. It is meant to describe planning above the Directorate level; that is, planning at one central point that encompasses the full range of CIA's responsibilities and programs, and which transcends the traditional budgetary plan which all agencies prepare annually. Such phrases as "strategic planning," or "management planning," or "corporate planning" could probably have been used, but the author desired to avoid argument about the meaning of such words as strategic, management and corporate in this or any other context. Agency Level Planning, as will be seen later on, really involved all of these factors in one way or another, almost regardless of the definitions one would wish to use. A list of the persons involved in CIA's planning effort from 1964 to 1971 is shown in the attachment.

It is probably safe to say that continuing attention to Agency-Level Planning in CIA began in 1965. Prior to this, there had been sporadic attention to specific Agency problems by inter-directorate teams or task forces which in some cases produced forms of ad hoc

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planning. With one exception,\* it was not until 1965, and the advent of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), that an Agency organization began continuing efforts in Agency-Level Planning.

There was, however, just prior to the establishment of PPBS, one major ad hoc planning effort which is worthy of mention. Admiral Rayborn, shortly after his appointment as DCI, commissioned a special study group under the direction of Lyman Kirkpatrick to prepare a long-range plan for CIA. The report which was produced in September 1965 by Mr. Kirkpatrick was an unusual document entitled Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency. Little would be accomplished by arguing whether or not, despite its title, this document constituted a plan. Several of those on the Kirkpatrick group spoke of the report as "a plan for a plan," and perhaps this interpretation is most accurate. However, the effort did have value. As Kirkpatrick points up in his covering letter to the Plan, it was most important that those involved in the effort believed that a permanent CIA planning staff was necessary and that the deliberations of his group developed an Agency viewpoint which had never before been apparent.

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\* O/PPB's predecessor organization, the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower (BPAM) included a Planning Staff. This staff, however, was very new and had little opportunity to develop planning methods before the advent of PPBS and the creation of O/PPB.

The Kirkpatrick Plan, as it has been called, included long-range assumptions concerning foreign developments and the impact of technology, a chapter on the present and future role of CIA, four chapters covering the long-range outlook for clandestine activities, intelligence production, reference services and support activities, and special papers dealing with thirteen significant subjects.

The Kirkpatrick Plan was not considered to be realistic when produced, and six years of history have proved this criticism to be accurate. The basic unrealism which was detected sprang largely from the Plan's conclusion that CIA would require, between 1965 and 1970, an additional 25X1A people to meet the dynamic expansion in requirements which were foreseen by the Clandestine Service, the Science and Technology Directorate, production functions and reference activities. The Plan did not foresee the domestic turmoil which the United States would experience, the economic conditions which have developed and the public's growing disinclination to enlarge the responsibilities of security elements of the Government. BUT IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THIS PLAN WAS PREPARED IN THE VERY BRIEF PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS. Considering the pressure of time and the fact that this was the first planning effort undertaken by CIA, it produced an unusually good result.

Special note should be made that the Kirkpatrick Plan recommended the establishment of a central planning staff in CIA. This recommendation asked that the planning staff be situated at the top level of the Agency, close to, but not part of, the budgetary processes of the Agency. However, after consideration of all factors, the planning function was placed within the newly created Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (O/PPB), since it was the Executive Director-Comptroller's belief that planning must be intimately associated with day-to-day resource management and budgetary realities. The Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting had been created (shortly after the Kirkpatrick Plan was produced) as a result of the President's adoption of the PPBS as the dominant Government resource management system. Thus, the new O/PPB existed, the Budget Bureau's doctrine argued that planning should be an integral part of the PPBS, the Executive Director-Comptroller was faced with a decision as to where to place the planning function, and a natural course of events followed.

O/PPB's first crack at Agency Level Planning, then, began in the late Winter of 1965. It began, it was thought logically, by an attempt to determine CIA's objectives. The first Program Call issued to implement the new planning, programming and budgeting

system, therefore, asked each component of the Agency to submit its operational objectives. As a result, a large number of such objectives were received by O/PPB and an effort was undertaken to synthesize these objectives -- that is, to eliminate the duplication, redundancy and contradiction in and among the objectives which had been received and to array them in a way which would facilitate assessment of the manner in which Agency programs contributed to the objectives. After an initial screening, it was found that the objectives submitted to O/PPB had not been screened at any level within the Directorates. Each component responding to the Program Call had simply listed its version of its objectives and mailed them in to O/PPB. The result was that the contradictions found between objectives from the same Directorate made it impossible to integrate them without further review within the Directorates. Also, there was an astonishing number of objectives to deal with -- in total, hundreds were received covering an extremely wide variety of activities.

The second phase of this early endeavor was an attempt to organize the objectives in the most coherent fashion possible and to return them to the Directorates for review leading to the elimination of contradictions and duplication. There was little enthusiasm within

the Directorates to perform this job and the enthusiasm within O/PPB, it must be admitted, was fast waning. After several weeks of reviewing comments from the Directorates and further attempts to integrate the objectives, O/PPB discontinued its attempts to create for CIA a total picture of its objectives. The classic approach of presenting a "heirarchy of objectives" for CIA, to be used as a basis for program review and resource decisions, was thus ended, but not forgotten.

Despite O/PPB's inability to complete the job it had started out to do, it did use the knowledge it had accumulated to produce a document in January 1966, which was entitled CIA Planning Assump-tions Goals and Objectives. This document, the predecessor of today's Planning Guidance, was issued to furnish CIA components basic guidance in the formulation of their programs and resource requests. This early effort contained a section which briefly presented a look at future world events, a section presenting the Agency's broad goals (in fact, being closer to statements of mission) and a section presenting objectives related to major activities such as production, collection, and covert action.

Later, in 1966, the CIA Planning Assumptions Goals and Objectives were reconstituted. The document became a fairly comprehensive

presentation of probable future world conditions as extracted by O/PPB from various National Intelligence Estimates which had been produced. The goals and objectives sections were completely eliminated from the publication. In the Fall of 1966, this new version was published for the guidance of the Directorates in their program planning and was entitled CIA Planning Assumptions.

During 1966 O/PPB also developed the concept of a Target Oriented Display. That is, to relate the use of resources to end purposes, rather than simply to functions or organizations. This concept was explained to the Bureau of the Budget at the working level and in a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director, Bureau of the Budget in the Fall of 1966. From this early conceptual beginning grew the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) which today is administered by the NIPE staff. This development is mentioned here as an aspect of planning, because the CIRIS system, or concept, has the potential for becoming a key element in reviewing past use of intelligence resources and to discern the planned use of resources in the future. As inaccurate as it still may be, CIRIS is the only means available to the DCI to determine how Intelligence Community resources are allocated by function (e.g., collection, production, etc.) and by target



(e.g., Soviet Union strategic offensive forces, ChiCom ground forces, etc.), and to discern the planned future allocation of Community resources.

During 1967 and 1968, O/PPB was perhaps more concerned with program review functions and budgeting than it was in nurturing the art of planning. Nevertheless, a few efforts were made which can clearly be placed under the label of planning and which are worthy of mention. The Planning Assumptions continued to be modified. The version published in the Fall of 1968 no longer was a brief extraction of published NIEs, but was a fairly comprehensive portrayal of anticipated developments in foreign affairs. The entire writing was done in O/PPB based upon the latest NIE on World Trends and other information available. Also, during 1968, considerable time was spent in O/PPB in assessing the planning techniques which would be most adaptable to CIA's peculiar problems and culture.

Beginning in 1967 and continuing through 1968, a member of the O/PPB Planning Staff became deeply interested in the possibility of establishing an over-all system for objectively determining the relative value of foreign countries as intelligence targets. Under this concept, the "threat" or "concern" to the US of each foreign


country would be expressed quantitatively by weighted scores. For example, under each country there would be uniform categorical breakdowns for such subjects as strategic weapons, conventional military forces, strategic base locations, economic factors, political influence, etc. A value would be assigned to each of these factors under each of the countries -- these values to be derived from a consensus of the intelligence experts in CIA or in the Community. Very simply stated, the country with the highest score would receive the highest national priority for intelligence, and so on down the line. Using this system as a base, intelligence managers could then review the existing commitment of intelligence resources against each country and against the sub-factors of each country to determine if budgeting was consistent with agreed upon priorities. This concept, of course, also provided for feedback and evaluation and for forecasting as integral parts of the system. A system this elaborate, this quantitative, this systematic, was not received with great enthusiasm within CIA at the time. Indeed, a proposal quite similar to this which was surfaced by NIPE in 1969 and again in 1971 has not caught the fancy of Agency management at the time of this writing. The original O/PPB paper was entitled The Economics of Intelligence.

At the time that the developments described above were taking place, CIA's planning effort was represented by the Planning Assumptions and the Program Memoranda which were prepared for submission to the Bureau of the Budget each Fall. The Planning Assumptions were improving in quality, but they were only for guidance -- they were not (and are not) directive in nature. The Program Memoranda were written independently to cover each of the seven CIA program categories, and thus, it was not possible to obtain a coherent view of where the Agency was headed, or according to what priorities. Furthermore, it was not easy, or perhaps even possible, to find a clear relationship between what was said in the Planning Assumptions, the Program Memoranda and the budget. In short, there were no visible connections between our assumptions regarding the future, the programs we proposed, and the budget we submitted.

The O/PPB planning group pondered this problem, once again evaluating the desirability of establishing a hierarchy of objectives which might become the connecting links which seemed so necessary. In the end, it was the consensus that the Agency's functions were so varied, and the organizations so unspecialized (i.e., each Directorate is involved in almost every program activity), that any expression of

total Agency objectives would be so large and complex as to offer little assistance to planning and management. It was at this point that the idea of "issue planning" became attractive. Issue planning is to some extent a compromise. The idea is that many areas of an organization are static and show little dynamic change with respect to their objectives and the programs which they follow. Therefore, there is little need for planning in these areas. Instead, management should look at those areas where there is anticipation of dynamic change and at specific problems and issues which may impact significantly on the organization's future -- in terms of mission, operations or resource requirements. In oversimplified terms, under this concept, the planning office disregards the bulk of the organization and concentrates on analysis of special problems and issues facing the total organization. This, as can be readily seen, greatly reduces the number of planning problems that must receive attention by the planning staff and management. The purpose of analyzing special problems and issues, for planning, is to assess the future impact of a particular development on the organization, to identify the effect such a development would have on functions and programs, to present alternative courses which could be adopted, and to present the effect each alternative would have on resource

requirements. Examples of this type of planning can be seen in



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At the same time that the O/PPB planning group began the identification of special problems and issues which should receive planning attention at the Agency level, other planning techniques were also under investigation. During late 1968 and 1969, two specific techniques were explored: a "Country Study" method of planning was investigated and work undertaken to prepare a model, and the DELPHI technique was examined and evaluated to determine its possible use in an intelligence organization.

The Country Study concept derived from earlier work done by the State Department's Management Staff under the Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS). The FAPS was perhaps the first attempt to systematize the review of foreign policy objectives and programs by the US Government. The system was developed prior to the establishment of PPBS and was tested in 1965 and 1966, principally in the Latin American area. The FAPS was designed to cover the foreign affairs programs of all Government agencies and involved the following processes:

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- The identification of US objectives in a particular country. These would be compiled by the Country Team, endorsed by the Ambassador and approved by the Department and the NSC regional groups. These studies of objectives (later called Country Analysis Strategy Papers -- CASPS) were also to include assessments of conditions in the countries and future prospects for achieving US goals.
- The alignment of US foreign affairs programs under each of the objectives.
- The identification of funds and manpower involved in each of these programs and those projected for the future.
- An analysis of the issues and problems resulting from the examinations above.

It is worth noting here that while FAPS did not make the grade at this time because of skepticism about the likelihood of applying systematic analysis to foreign affairs activities, and because of Defense Department's and CIA's disinclination to become involved in the program, it was resurrected in 1970 and has become the basic tool in State's new management system which resulted from the Macomber Task Force. It is also worth mention that David Osborne,

former Deputy Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, while Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, conducted further experiments with FAPS. His particular contribution was to explore means of assessing the "probability" of achieving foreign policy objectives, which he was convinced should be considered along with any system developed to determine the priority of objectives.

At any rate, the O/PPB group studied FAPS materials, met with David Osborne and set about to see to what extent the FAPS concepts could be applied to intelligence programs. It was decided that it would be worthwhile to try to create a model using [REDACTED] 25X1A as a test case. [REDACTED] was selected because a current CASP 25X1A existed, which provided an approved set of US foreign policy objectives, because the Clandestine Service at that time had an exemplary array of programs against [REDACTED] (i.e., unilateral 25X1A and liaison collection projects, propaganda, labor and political covert action programs), and because O/PPB possessed a good description of [REDACTED] The 25X1A O/PPB model involved displaying the US objectives, aligning CS objectives and programs appropriately against these objectives, identifying consistencies and inconsistencies (i.e., objectives where CIA had no programs and CIA programs where there were no objectives)

and designing a system for relating the use of funds and manpower against the various programs and objectives. This model was never fully completed by the O/PPB planning group due to the departure of the analysts who were performing this task and interest that developed in following other planning approaches. Fortunately, however, the effort which had been spent to develop this model was not wasted.

In 1970, the Missions and Programs Staff of the DD/P became interested in improving the CS management and planning system and used the O/PPB [REDACTED] model as a basis for establishing the CS Country Programming System which is now in effect. Similarly,

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NIPE Staff, after discussions with O/PPB on FAPS and the [REDACTED] model, developed a proposed system for evaluating the priority of objectives and intelligence programs against foreign countries.

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DELPHI, the other planning technique explored at the same time, is a method developed by the RAND Corporation for achieving the consensus of experts on solutions to problems, to assess alternatives, to establish priorities, to forecast developments, and so forth, in areas where exact knowledge cannot be obtained. For example, the DELPHI method can be used to obtain the best judgment of a group of scientists to predict when a particular technological breakthrough may be expected. The DELPHI method is based upon obtaining the



views anonymously from a group of experts on a subject, such as the example, "playing back" to the group the results of the first attempt, the results of the second attempt, and so on until consensus is obtained. The O/PPB planning group tested the DELPHI with a small group of players in early 1969 and found the results encouraging for problem solving, forecasting, and for establishing objectives and priorities. Later on, the DD/P ran a DELPHI to elicit the views of an expert group of operations officer to determine the current objectives of the CS. Later, another DELPHI was carried out within the DD/P to assess its Country Programming System. Other DELPHIs have been run by the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Training, and other components. DELPHI seems to be a planning technique which will have many applications in intelligence planning, since many of our problems have no exact textbook answers and depend upon the considered judgments of experts.

In the Fall of 1968, the O/PPB Planning Staff formed a group to consider carefully all techniques which might be applied to the business of intelligence resource planning and to develop recommendations regarding the basic planning concepts which should be adopted. The results of the group's examination were submitted to the Director, PPB in January 1969. In essence, the group's conclusions were as follows:

- The Planning Assumptions constituted an adequate projection of external events and their likely impact on the Agency's objectives and programs.
- The CIA Budget and the Program Memoranda provided a generalized picture of the thrust and objectives of CIA and could be considered as parts of an Agency Level Planning system.
- The program review process by O/PPB and the Agency's top management in effect represented an effective, if incremental, planning process.
- It would be impracticable to establish a network or heirarchy of Agency objectives to guide program planning, or to install a formal planning system such as used in some business organizations.
- That "issue planning" (discussed earlier) seemed the most appropriate method to be emphasized by CIA in improving its planning processes.

The recommendations contained in this study were adopted in principle by the Director, PPB in early 1969 and the O/PPB planning group continued its efforts to identify issues which would effect CIA's future programs and to express them in a form which would enable the Agency's management to take the proper action.

Meanwhile, back at the Planning Assumptions, new developments were also taking place in 1969. Due to suggestions and feedback from the Agency's operating elements, it was decided to establish a more authoritative basis for the forecasting of world trends. With the Executive Director-Comptroller's approval, the Office of National Estimates was asked to prepare a world trends estimate expressly for use in the Planning Assumptions. ONE agreed to do this, and thus, the Assumptions began to represent a more substantively valid expression of likely developments in world events as they concern US security and policy interests. Also in 1969, the first "Implications" were added to the Assumptions. Beginning this year, the CIA Planning Assumptions contained sections which interpreted the impact of world developments on the programs and objectives of CIA. These interpretations, for simplicity, were, and still are, referred to as implications. In this first year, the implications were prepared by O/PPB, circulated to the Directorates, and then revised on the basis of the comments received. This process catalyzed planning at all levels. In subsequent years, the Directorates have been asked to prepare implications themselves and these have been revised or supplemented by O/PPB.

The work continued to identify and structure issues in a form which would assist the Agency's management planning processes.

By the end of 1969, several issues had been examined and prepared for top management attention. Those issued concerned such topics as the future deployment of technical collection sensors by human agents, future intelligence requirements with respect to Communist China, the impact on CIA programs and resources of a settlement in Indochina, the impact of non-official cover, and several other significant subjects. (For clarity, it is noted here that at this time in history, the planning issues became known as "Planning Objectives," in the event that some interested person decides to do some research in this area.)

Unfortunately, Agency management was apparently not sufficiently interested to pursue the Planning Objectives which had been suggested. Perhaps too many issues were presented at one time -- perhaps the issues themselves were believed to be too knotty, or perhaps management felt that the items proposed should be the normal concern of Directorate management. In any event, there was no action taken to pursue the planning which had been proposed. The work which had been done was used to a limited extent some months later in the background papers which were prepared for the Director's conference with his Deputies. It is likely that many of the Planning Objectives identified in late 1969 would still represent valid areas for Agency study and planning.

By the end of 1969, then, a wide variety of approaches to Agency Level Planning had been explored and some had been tested and adopted. But there was certainly not the feeling on the part of the O/PPB planning group that any significant changes had been wrought. The Agency's ability to look ahead and anticipate change, to estimate its future resource requirements past one or two years, or to forecast needed changes in its programs and objectives had not improved measurably. The fact remained that long-term planning remained very limited and ad hoc and that it still was not possible to discern a substantive connection between Planning Assumptions, program plans and the annual budget. Policy guidance with regard to objectives and priorities still did not exist.

Work continued into 1970 to refine and to determine means by which top management attention and action could be focused on Planning Objectives. Each issue (Planning Objective) selected was subjected to stringent review as to substantive importance, probability of solution and format. Format was considered to be of considerably more importance than might be thought, since it was the planning group's intention to make it clear that these objectives were not simply to bring management's attention to a problem, but to chart out the course for analysis of the problem, to identify the type of approach to be taken, the estimated time involved and the form of the resultant

recommendations -- that is, to present a solution to a problem in the form of an action plan. Each objective selected, of course, was considered to have some significant long-range resource implications. An example of one such Planning Objective can be seen in the one prepared for Propaganda Programs against the USSR. When forwarding this objective, the Planning Staff provided a brief substantive background which described changes in the world environment and the likely effect of these changes on propaganda activities and a section which described the planning factors which should be addressed. These planning factors involved identification of the present and future objectives of propaganda activities against the USSR, an examination of existing programs and the development of a comprehensive plan which would address:

- mid- and long-term objectives;
- preparation of a general strategy for action;
- description of present programs;
- analysis of risks and uncertainties;
- projection of resource requirements for future programs;
- description of future programs;
- establishment of a program coordinator; and
- provision for periodic evaluation and reporting to

Agency management.

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As the planning group pursued its work on the Planning Objectives, concern began to be registered once again about the lack of a comprehensive formulation of Agency objectives and priorities. (The reader is reminded that Planning Objectives would constitute only a description of selected issues and problems which were felt to be of significance to the Agency's future, and would not cover anywhere near the totality of Agency functions.) Pressures built up within the planning group for the development of a proposal for a formal planning system for CIA; that is, the creation of a formalized planning structure complete with objectives, priorities, planning responsibilities and procedures for a continuous, systematic planning operation.

In April 1970 a member of the planning group prepared a comprehensive evaluation of CIA's existing Agency Level Planning efforts, including a description of the major deficiencies in the system and steps which could be taken for improvement. Among the deficiencies noted were the following:

- Unclear policy guidance.
- Failure to clarify major objectives.
- Failure to clarify relative priorities.
- Inadequate responses to the programming system.

- Failure to integrate the seven program plans into an integrated Agency plan.
- Failure to anticipate short-term contingency situations.
- Inadequate attention to long-term developments and requirements.
- Insufficient coordination among Directorates.

Among the suggestions for improvement which were noted were the following:

- Definition of Agency major objectives and priorities, even if in a general way, endorsed by the Director.
- Use of these objectives to coordinate the substantive and operational programs of the Agency.
- The development of strategies for achieving major objectives which incorporated the programs and capabilities of every component of the Agency.
- The evaluation of policy options -- i.e., to determine CIA's legal basis, intention or desire to engage in certain programs.
- Separation of the planning function from the budgeting function, thereby removing the psychological and cultural barriers and the restraints imposed by primary concern on resources.



- Provide a separate "Call" for Agency plans -- that is, separate the call for plans from the call for budget preparation.
- Issuance of an annual Director's overview paper which presents policy guidance to Directorates.
- Increased attention to special analysis of special issues and increased use of planning techniques such as DELPHI to assist in the determination of objective and priorities and to identify options and alternatives.

During this same general period, in late 1969 and early 1970, the Planning Staff suggested that O/PPB present a proposal for improving the Agency's research and development planning. The Agency's R&D program at that time was the subject of considerable debate because of allegations concerning unclear objectives and priorities and of duplication and overlap of effort among Agency R&D elements. The Planning Staff undertook preparation of a formal Agency R&D planning system in early 1970 and after several weeks of review and analysis concluded that, while a suitable model could be developed for R&D, R&D was but one element of Agency activity and should not be approached separately from the other Agency programs which it supported. In short, the case was made that there should be

a design for a total Agency planning system with R&D becoming a subset of this total design.

After staff review and consideration of these findings, it was decided that the Planning Staff should prepare a proposal for a complete formal planning system for CIA and at the same time complete the work begun on the R&D problem. The R&D planning system would serve as a concrete model for planning in one area of activity under a total system concept.

In October 1970 the Planning Staff completed two papers: one entitled Agency Planning, and a second, Some Fundamental Aspects To Consider In Agency RD&E Program Planning. The Agency planning paper addressed a planning system comprised of three essential steps: premises, planning, and implementation and review. The premises would embody the basic missions of CIA, the impact of external and internal environmental factors, and forecasts of anticipated developments. The planning phase would involve the development of strategic plans, major objectives and policies at the Agency level. Implementation and review would involve operational planning, project-level planning, implementing programs and a review and evaluation activity. This paper also contained a proposed organization of the Agency-level planning function and a design for the procedures

needed to carry out the system concept. This paper was presented to the Director, PPB in October 1970 and to the O/PPB conference in [REDACTED] which took place that same month. No specific action resulted from presentation of the plan. It was not submitted to higher authority perhaps because it represented a formula for integrating the functions of the four CIA Directorates into a total planning system which then, and even now, runs counter to the desires of the Director and his Deputies.

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The subordinate paper concerning R&D planning was published and circulated separately but at about the same time as the paper discussed above. This paper described the basic elements to be incorporated in R&D planning and provided examples and actions which could be taken to improve R&D planning. The R&D paper was used to some extent in the policy deliberations which were then taking place with regard to CIA's R&D problems, and was distributed to key officials in the Agency's R&D activities. While it was not formally acted upon, its principles were adopted to some extent by the R&D Review Board.

In late 1970, the Planning Staff concluded that one important and potentially profitable area of planning had not yet been attempted. Up until this time, as described earlier in this paper, O/PPB had

considered a fairly wide range of planning concepts and devices (objectives, DELPHI, formal planning system, etc.), but had not explored the idea of developing intelligence "strategies" as vehicles for Agency-level planning.

A "strategy," in this context, is to select a significant area of intelligence concern, to explore it in depth, to forecast developments and contingencies, and to plan for likely future program needs. An adequate "strategy" would obviously require the collaboration of all Agency components concerned with the subject matter under consideration -- collection, covert action and production.

In early 1971, two members of the Planning Staff undertook preparation of "strategies" for intelligence problems related to the Soviet Union and Communist China. This involved the preparation of two papers, one for each country. The Soviet paper, which is used as the example, contained discussion of the following factors:

- US-Soviet power relationship
- Soviet policy
- US policy
- Indicators of changes in the relationship
- Agency programs targeting the Soviet Union
- Potential changes in program emphasis
- Planning implications

After approval of the Director, PPB, both papers were circulated to operating elements within CIA to acquire the reviews of specialists regarding the potential of such a planning approach, to validate the substantive portions of the papers and to stimulate the coordinated planning which was the end-purpose of strategy papers. Specifically, it was hoped that the Agency's "community" of Soviet specialists would, acting in concert, review historical factors in the US/Soviet relationship, forecast probable future developments, compare these future developments with current intelligence programs and describe programs which would be needed to meet future needs.

There was a very mixed reception given the two strategy papers which were issued. The Soviet paper became bogged down in controversy about the substantive interpretations contained in the O/PPB proposal, and there was no great enthusiasm, particularly within the Plans Directorate, for joining hands to create a unified Agency strategy. The Intelligence Directorate had no serious argument with the concept involved, but believed that the substantive interpretations should be modified. The DD/I Planning Staff agreed to prepare its own version of the substantive elements, but to date nothing has been received -- nor has the Planning Staff pushed the DD/I for its views.

The China paper met with a much better reception, principally because a China group, headed by a China coordinator, already existed within the Agency. The China coordinator responded affirmatively to the concept proposed, and it was noted that shortly thereafter the China group embarked on a program which was markedly similar to the proposals contained in the China strategy paper. The Planning Staff does not know if this was the result of the stimulus provided by the strategy paper, or if it was simply a matter of independent invention, which so often is the case in the intelligence business.

Thus, the idea of preparing strategy papers is another chapter in the history of Agency planning approaches. Some gain was achieved, but it cannot be said that the approach took hold within CIA. Perhaps a strategy paper, per se, is not a strong enough device for bringing together the capabilities and expertise which exist in CIA's four Directorates to focus on subjects of importance and mutual concern. On reflection, it appears that some means of achieving authoritative inter-Directorate coordination must exist before an Agency-wide approach to intelligence problems can be made. O/PPB's mission is not sufficiently clear in the substantive areas to bring about the coordinated effort which is necessary.

In the Fall of 1971, the Planning Staff proposed still another planning "system" for CIA. The essential purpose of this proposal was to support a more active role by the Executive Director-Comptroller in planning and resource allocation. Two mechanisms were proposed: an Executive Director-Comptroller's "operating plan" and an Executive Director-Comptroller's "annual report to the Director." These instruments would be designed to tie together the identification and resolution of intelligence consumer and policy issues and intelligence resource issues, to measure and guide the performance of the Agency as a whole, and to facilitate coordination of current and future programs involving two or more Directorates. .

As can be seen, an essential step of this package proposal was to energize the first element -- to identify substantive issues, since it was argued that resolution of such issues is the basic function of intelligence. The secondary step would be to translate unresolved substantive issues into resource issues. Four basic approaches were suggested to identify substantive issues:


- "Big Issue" Determination -- an approach in which major policy issues requiring an important intelligence input are identified through consultation with the NSC, the

President's Committee for International Economic Policy,  
the State Department, the Defense Department, etc.

- Objectives and Priorities Determination -- a comprehensive approach to resource issues utilizing the objectives and priorities of DCID 1/2 as a starting point.
- Intelligence Gaps Determination -- use of reviews of national gaps as revealed during the estimative process.
- Feedback -- establishment of an identifiable feedback mechanism to determine the extent to which consumer needs remain unsatisfied after a response has been made.

At the same time, each of the four above approaches was considered to be a module, suitable for separate implementation by itself but promising more return when employed together with one or more of the other approaches.

The proposal just described was presented to the Director, PPB in mid-December 1971 for his review and determination of future action. Whatever decisions ensue can become part of the next chapter in this informal chronology.



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
29 December 1971



Persons Directly Involved in Agency-Level Planning


1964 to 1971

Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower



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Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting



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Note: The persons above were directly involved in the planning efforts described in this paper. The approximate dates of their involvement are shown in parentheses. While somewhat arbitrary, the names of other persons engaged primarily in budgetary work and program review have not been included in this list, although several were engaged for brief periods in planning functions.